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Abstract
Recent research has demonstrated that while government expenditures
are countercyclical in most industrialized countries, they tend to be pro-
cyclical in developing countries. We develop a dynamic political-economy
model to explain this phenomenon. Simulations of the model allow us to
quantitatively compare the relative role of common explanations for scal
procyclicality. We conclude that rent seeking within the scal process can
explain scal procyclicality better than other common explanations, such
as borrowing constraints and macroeconomic volatility. (JEL E62, D72,
F41)
It has been observed that scal policies di¤er greatly across income lines.
Fiscal policies in almost all high-income countries are countercyclical1 , reected
in countercyclical government expenditures and decits, and procyclical tax
revenues. Fiscal behavior in developing countries is quite di¤erent. Whether in
I am highly indebted to Allan Drazen for his advice and to Graciella Kaminsky, Carmen
Reinhart, and Carlos Vegh for their advice and for sharing their data. I also thank Arpad
Abraham, Boragan Aruoba, Guillermo Calvo, Robert Kollmann, Enrique Mendoza, Virgiliu
Midrigan, Peter Murrell, John Shea, Harald Uhlig, and John Wallis for their useful comments.
Participants in workshops at the University of Maryland and the Universite Libre de Brux-
elles and at the meetings of the LACEAs Political Economy Group also provided helpful
suggestions.
1Throughout this paper, procyclicality or scal procyclicality will refer to some combination
of procyclical decits, procyclical government expenditures, and countercyclical tax rates. The
focus will mainly be on government expenditures. Countercyclical polices are a combination
of countercyclical decits, countercyclical government expenditures, and procyclical tax rates.
Data is from the International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook database from 1970
to 2003.
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Latin America (Gavin and Perotti, 1997) or elsewhere in the developing world
(Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2004), governments tend to spend and borrow
more as economic conditions improve. That is, they conduct procyclical scal
policies.
The objective of this paper to provide a theory of scal cyclicality that
takes into account the basic stylized facts of scal policy in high-income and
developing countries. We will see that the di¤erence across income lines in the
conduct of scal policy is mainly on the expenditure, not the revenue side of
the ledger. Particularly, there is are indications that government transfers are
the main countercyclical component of spending in high-income countries.
Since social-insurance programs make up a large share of government trans-
fers in high-income countries, we nd it realistic to model the cyclical component
of government expenditure as the provision of intertemporal insurance for con-
sumers. In this model, scal policy tends to be countercyclical. To explain why
scal policy di¤ers in developing countries, we consider two types of distortions.
First, we add a political distortion, where the government may use the sc to
extract rents. Second, we tighten borrowing constraints. These two distortions
correspond to two commonly suggested explanations for the procyclicality of
scal policy in developing countries.
We show theoretically that scal policy may become less countercyclical and
indeed procyclical as the institutional capacity of the government to extract
rents increases. This phenomenon occurs because a government that values
both consumer welfare and extracted rents would tend to extract rents when
consumersmarginal utility of consumption is low. The intuition is similar to
that in Battaglini and Coate (2006). There, public o¢ cials seek rents when the
marginal value of the public good is low. Here, the cyclical component of public
spending is intertemporal insurance. The marginal value of such insurance is
endogenously countercyclical. Thus rent extraction is procyclical. As a gov-
ernments institutional ability to extract rents increases, rent extraction may
dominate the cyclicality of government spending, making the latter procyclical.
As for the other modelled explanation, we show that it is theoretically plau-
sible that binding borrowing constraints make government transfers less coun-
tercyclical. However, we nd that borrowing constraints fail to explain scal
procyclicality in two ways. First, in simulations of the model, borrowing con-
straints do not signicantly contribute to scal procyclicality. Moreover, they
only contribute to scal procyclicality when scal policy is already procyclical
due to political factors. This is because a forward looking government will at-
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tempt to save more (and spend less) in business cycle peaks in anticipation of
potential constraints on borrowing in the future. Spending will be more coun-
tercyclical when borrowing constraints are not binding, compensating for its
procyclicality when constraints are binding. Second, our model predicts that
borrowing constraints bind, and thus a¤ect the cyclicality of government expen-
diture, in business cycle downturns. If borrowing constraints were the cause for
scal procyclicality, we would expect spending to be more procyclical during
downturns. In fact, government expenditure in developing countries is no not
much di¤erent in business cycle peaks and in troughs.
1 Stylized Facts
Figures I-III present the main cross-country di¤erences in scal policies. The
most striking di¤erence between scal policies in developing- and high-income-
countries is in government expenditure, as demonstrated in Figure I. The graph
plots the correlation between the cyclical component of real government expen-
ditures and the cyclical component of real GDP between the years 1970 and
2003, against PPP GDP per capita in 1970. Cyclical components are measured
using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter. Expenditures are countercyclical in all
but a handful of high-income countries, but procyclical in almost all developing
countries in the sample. A negative correlation between the degree of procycli-
cality and income per capita is apparent.
It is di¢ cult to assess the cyclicality of tax policies, since time-series data
on tax ratesthe relevant policy variableare unavailable for most developing
countries. While there is anecdotal and indirect evidence that tax rates may
be countercyclical in a number of developing countries (see for example Kamin-
sky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004), this does not translate into a di¤erence in the
cyclicality of tax revenues. As Figure II demonstrates, the cyclicality of tax
revenues is not correlated with GDP per capita. The average correlation be-
tween tax revenues and GDP is similar in developing countries (.43) and in
high-income countries (.44).
In high-income countries, the combination of countercyclical government ex-
penditures and procyclical tax revenues generates unambiguously procyclical
surpluses, with an average correlation of .43 between their cyclical component
and the cyclical component of GDP. Developing countries, whose expenditures
and revenues are both procyclical, show great variance in the cyclicality of their
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surpluses, as shown in Figure III. Surpluses in developing countries are acyclical
on average.
It appears that the di¤erences in scal policies across income lines can be
mainly attributed to di¤erences in government spending patterns. So far, we
have looked at total government expenditure, which includes government con-
sumption, investment, transfers, and interest payments. It is interesting to
consider the cyclicality of some of these components. Table I presents the basic
stylized facts. Government investment and consumption are both procyclical
in high-income countries with correlation coe¢ cients not much di¤erent than
in developing countries2 . Interest payments are acyclical, on average, in both
income groups3 . The main remaining component of total government expen-
diture is transfer payments. Transfer payments would appear to be the main
driver of high-income countriescountercyclical spending patterns. The gures
in Table I may also indicate that transfer payments are more procyclical than
other components of government spending in developing countries.
Focusing on developing countries, Table II compares the cyclicality of over-
all government spending during periods that are above the HP lter trend to
below-trend periods. The di¤erence between these two correlations is not statis-
tically signicant, indicating that spending is no less procyclical in good times
than in bad. We also look at the correlation of the cyclical components of
real government expenditure and real GDP when excluding crisis years, dened
as those when cyclical output dropped by more than two standard deviations.
As shown in Table II, the procyclicality of government expenditure drops by
a statistically insignicant margin. In fact, in several recent output drops of
those magnitudes (South Korea, 1998; Turkey, 2001; Argentina, 2002) govern-
ment spending was above-trend. There is no evidence that the procyclicality of
government expenditure is restricted to cyclical downturns.
2This contrasts with Talvi and Veghs (2005) nding that high-income countriesgovern-
ment consumption is acyclical. In any case, their ndings are consistent with the view that
transfers are the main countercyclical component of government spending in high-income
countries.
3Data on interest payments was available for only a subset of countries, and for fewer
years. The data is also from a di¤erent source, the International Monetary Funds Government
Finance Statistics.
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2 Literature Review
Gavin and Perotti, 1997, and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2004 provide the
primary evidence of the procyclicality of scal policies in developing countries.
Additional empirical work by Lane (2003) and Alesina and Tabellini (2005)
shows that political distortions play a role in explaining scal procyclicality
where it is present. The latter show that controlling for a measure of corruption,
scal policys cyclicality is no longer correlated with income per capita. An
empirical exercise in Appendix B rea¢ rms Alesina and Tabellinis (2005) results.
In contrast to their result, we do not nd that democracy plays an important
role in explaining cross-country di¤erences in scal cyclicality.
A number of explanations have been proposed for the phenomenon of scal
procyclicality. They fall into three broad categories. First, Gavin and Perotti
(1997) suggest that borrowing constraints in developing countries are the cause
for scal procyclicality. When borrowing constraints are binding, governments
may have no choice but to rely entirely on tax revenues to nance expenditures.
This forces governments to either cut expenditures or raise taxes in bad times,
yielding scal procyclicality. Riascos and Vegh (2003), and Mendoza and Oviedo
(2006), also explore the role nancial market imperfections. Second, a number of
theories suggest that political distortions may cause scal procyclicality. Talvi
and Vegh (2005) show that political distortions based on Tornell and Lanes
(1999) "voracity e¤ect" may be the culprit for procyclical policies. Alesina
and Tabellini (2005) develop a voting model, in which procyclicality is a side
e¤ect of votersattempts to discipline rent-seeking o¢ cials. Third, it has been
suggested that the procyclicality of scal policy in developing countries may
be no more than an optimal reaction to the di¤erent stochastic environment
confronting developing countries. Talvi and Veghs (2005) political-economy
model, for example, requires an interaction between a political distortion and
higher macroeconomic volatility to generate scal procyclicality.
This paper contributes to the literature on scal procyclicality by presenting
a macroeconomic model of scal policy that allows for these three proposed
explanations for scal procyclicality. Beyond proposing a political economy
model for scal procyclicality, it provides a unique contribution to the literature
by allowing a theoretical and quantitative analysis of the comparative potential
of each of these explanations to account for the scal procyclicality observed in
developing countries.
There is a large macroeconomic literature on scal policy, stemming from
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Barro (1979)4 and a natural point of departure would be to build on them in
modelling scal policy. The di¢ culty in doing so is that this line of research
usually models tax policy alone. Government expenditure patterns are, with
some exceptions, modeled as an exogenous process. On the other hand, the
main stylized facts in need of explanation are di¤erences in the cyclicality of
government expenditure. This paper follows Battaglini and Coate (2006) in
allowing government expenditures, tax rates, and decits to be endogenously
chosen. The novelty here is modelling government expenditures as providing in-
tertemporal insurance for consumers who do not have access to capital markets.
Modelled as such, government expenditures are endogenously countercyclical.
3 The Model
A small open economy consists of two types of agents: a continuum of homoge-
neous consumers and a government. The addition of a neoclassical rm in the
following section for purposes of calibration does not alter any of the models
results. There are two goods: consumption c and leisure (represented as 1  `,
where ` 2 [0; 1] is labor). Consumers face an exogenous wage process wt; with
support [wmin; wmax] and jointly choose their labor contribution and consump-
tion in each period. They do not have access to capital markets. This friction
provides the rationale for government spending. The government uses its abil-
ity to borrow and save in international capital markets to provide intertemporal
insurance for consumers. The models results would also hold if only a fraction
of consumers had no access to nancial markets.
Modeling scal policy in such a way has two advantages. First, we have seen
that the main source of countercyclicality in the spending behavior of govern-
ments in high-income countries is government transfers, of which social insur-
ance programs are a large component. Second, scal policy used for this purpose
would naturally tend to be countercyclical. This biases the model against scal
procyclicality, which the modeled political and economic distortions will need
to overcome.
A political distortion is introduced by allowing the government to extract
rents through the scal process. These rents may be viewed as funds diverted for
the governments political objectives, or as funds transferred to special interest
4See, for example, Chari and Kehoe (1999), S. Rao Aiyagari et al (2002), and the papers
cited therein.
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groups. In addition to the utility it receives from providing intertemporal insur-
ance to consumers, the government also values the quantity of rents extracted.
3.1 Consumers
A representative consumer replaces the continuum of consumers, given their ho-
mogeneity. The representative consumer chooses consumption and hours worked
in each period to maximize lifetime utility. She has preferences over consump-
tion and hours worked as follows:
1X
t=0
tu (ct; `t)
Preferences are such that uc > 0; ucc < 0; u` < 0; u`` < 0, and the Inada
conditions hold. Utility is separable in leisure and consumption, so that uc` = 0.
The consumer has no ability to borrow or to save. Consumers obtain income
from labor earnings, which generate wages wt per unit of labor supplied, and
are taxed at a rate of  t. In this section, wages are exogenous, but they will
be determined endogenously when rms are introduced in the following section.
The representative consumer also receives a lump-sum transfer of gt from the
government. The consumer knows wt;  t; gt at the beginning of each period.
Her budget constraint is:
(1) ct = (1   t)wt`t + gt
Since the consumer has no access to credit markets, her optimization problem
of maximizing lifetime utility subject to (1) is static in each period, yielding the
following rst order condition:
(2) (1   t)wtuc + u` = 0
3.2 The Government
The scal agents preferences over citizen welfare and rent extraction are as
follows:
(3)
1X
t=0
t [(1  )u (ct; `t) + v(St)]
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where St are the rents extracted by the scal agent at time t and  2 [0; 1) is
a parameter representing the relative importance he places on rent extraction
compared to citizen welfare. The function v (S) is strictly concave, and satises
the Inada conditions. High levels of  could represent high levels of corruption,
the absence of appropriate scal safeguards or scal transparency, or a political
process governing the sc that creates large incentives for pork-barrel spend-
ing. Rents could be viewed as being diverted for the political objectives of the
government, or as rents transferred to special interest groups.
The cyclical component of government spending is used solely for two pur-
poses in the model: social insurance and rents. We do not suggest that these
are the only components of government expenditure in reality. The results of
the model would be identical if the government used its scal resources for other
purposes, as long as they have no particular cyclical pattern. Also, with homo-
geneous consumers, social insurance includes no inter-personal transfers. We
are therefore understating the size of the budget allocated to social insurance.
In short, the model should be viewed as a model of the cyclicality of scal policy,
not its budgetary composition.
The government generates revenues from distortionary taxes on consumers
labor income. Tax revenues can be costlessly transformed into a unit of the
transfer payment, gt, or into a unit of extracted rents, St. Rent-seeking occurs
within the scal process, i.e. total government expenditure is given by:
(4) Gt = St + gt
The government has access to international capital markets and can borrow
and save at a constant and exogenous interest rate r. The governments budget
constraint is:
(5) St =  twt`t + bt+1   (1 + r) bt   gt
where bt is government borrowing (or saving, when its sign is negative) in the
form of one-period bonds, denominated in units of the consumption good and
due for repayment at time t.
It will be convenient to combine the governments and consumersbudget
constraints to obtain an overall resource constraint:
(6) St = wt`t   ct + bt+1   (1 + r) bt
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3.3 Sequence of Events
In each period the sequence of events is as follows:
1. The shock to the wage rate wt is realized.
2. The government chooses a vector fgt (wt; bt) ;  t (wt; bt) ; bt+1 (wt; bt) ; St (wt; bt)g.
It announces and can credibly commit to a policy vector fgt;  tg. It takes
into account that its policy uniquely determines consumerschoice of con-
sumption ct (gt;  t; wt) and labor contribution `t (gt;  t; wt) through (1)
and (2).
3. Consumers observe the policy vector fgt;  tg and the wage rate, wt, and
choose their consumption ct (gt;  t; wt) and labor contribution `t (gt;  t; wt).
As is common in the Ramsey taxation literature, we can reformulate the
governments problem, such that it is choosing consumer allocations directly,
while taking into account that its chosen allocations must satisfy the con-
sumers optimality conditions. Unlike the Ramsey taxation literature, it is
impossible to remove all policy variables from the governments decision prob-
lem. The governments problem is to chose fgt (wt; bt) ;  t (wt; bt) ; bt+1 (wt; bt) ;
St (wt; bt) ; ct (wt; bt) ; `t (bt; wt)g to maximize (3), subject to (6), and the imple-
mentability constraints (1) and (2). Additional constraints reect the govern-
ments ability to use lump-sum transfers, but not to impose lump-sum taxes,
and that the government faces a borrowing constraint:
gt  0(7)
bt+1  bmax
where bmax = min

b; wminr
	
, with b and wminr representing an exogenous borrow-
ing constraint and the highest level of debt that can be repaid almost surely,
respectively.
3.4 Maximization Problem
Replacing St using (6), and gt using (1), the governments maximization problem
is:
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max
ct;`t;t;bt+1
E0
1X
t=0
tf(1  )u (ct; `t)
+v [wt`t   ct + bt+1   (1 + r) bt]
+
1  

t [(1   t)wtuc (ct) + u` (`t)](8)
+
1  

t [ct   (1   t)wt`t] +
1  

t (bmax   bt+1)g
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (2), t is the multiplier of the
the non-negativity constraint on gt, and t is the multiplier of the borrowing
constraint, all multiplied by the constant 1  for future notational convenience.
The rst order conditions of the governments problem yield:
(9) uc +  +  (1  )wucc = 
(10)  u` + (1  )w   u`` = w
(11) ` = uc
(12)  =  (1 + r)E0 + 
in addition to (1), (2) and (6) and the complementary slackness conditions
g = 0 and  (bmax   b0) = 0. Time t subscripts are suppressed and x0 represents
a variable xs value in the following period. E is the expectations operator. The
variable t is dened as:
(13) t  
1  v
0 (St)
and is introduced for notational convenience: it leaves equations (9) to (12)
unchanged in the special case  = 0. In this case the governments maximization
problem is:
max
ct;`t;t;bt+1
E0
1X
t=0
tfu (ct; `t)(14)
+t [wt`t   ct + bt+1   (1 + r) bt]
+t [(1   t)wtuc (ct; `t) + u` (ct; `t)]
+t [ct   (1   t)wt`t] + t (bmax   bt+1)g
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with t now the Lagrange multiplier on the overall resource constraint (6), where
St = 0 8t.
3.5 Dynamic Analysis
The sequence (12) is a supermartingale in t. When (1 + r)  1,  converges
almost surely to 0, since t  0 8t. This convergence implies asymptotically
innite levels of rent extraction, St, and of consumption, ct, nanced by an
innite level of assets,  bt. To avoid dynamics of this sort, we assume (1 +
r) < 1. With this assumption, the sequence (12) converges almost surely to
an invariate probability distribution of debt, bt+1. (See Mendoza and Oviedo
(2006) for an extensive discussion of a system with dynamics of this sort.)
A rst result, whose proof is in Appendix A, is useful in analyzing the models
dynamics.
Lemma 1 It is never optimal for the government to tax and transfer in the
same period.
The intuition of this result is as follows. Since taxes are distortionary, it
is always more e¢ cient to decrease the lump sum transfer to citizens than to
increase taxes. It can never be optimal to tax and transfer at the same time.
This should not be viewed as a counterfactual prediction of the model and is
again driven by the assumption that consumers are homogeneous. If consumers
were heterogeneous there could still be a redistributionary reason to tax some
consumers and transfer to others.
Equation (12) is a standard intertemporal Euler equation. But (13) indicates
that it is rent extraction, not consumption or hours worked, that is smoothed.
In the case  = 0, it is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, ; that
is smoothed, with no guarantee of consumption smoothing. Substituting (11)
and (1) into (9), and using the complementary slackness condition, tgt = 0,
highlights this result:
(15) uc (ct) + t (1  t) = t
where t is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion with respect to consumption,
dened as:
(16) t   ctucc
uc
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Recall that consumers have no access to capital markets, while the govern-
ment can only implement a given allocation through lump-sum transfers or
distortionary taxation. Only allocations that conform to (2) are implementable.
When the transfer good is provided, gt > 0, t = 0; and we retrieve the stan-
dard consumption smoothing result: uc (ct) = t. However, when the govern-
ment chooses to tax,  t > 0, gt = 0 and t  0 (due to Lemma 1). The term
t (1  t) then reects the deviation from full consumption smoothing due to
the distortionary costs of taxation required to implement a desired consump-
tion allocation. If lump sum taxation were allowed, t = 0, and the government
would provide a rst-best level of consumption, ct = u 1c (t), both when taxing
and when transferring. When risk aversion is low: t < 1, the government will
allow consumers to over-consume relative to the rst best. This is because the
implementability constraint (2) would require very high taxes and very large
increases in hours worked to bring the consumer to the rst-best level of con-
sumption. When risk aversion is high t > 1; the government allows the con-
sumer undershoot the rst-best level of consumption, as the distortionary taxes
needed to raise revenue cause consumers to adjust consumption excessively. In
the case of logarithmic preferences (t ! 1), these two e¤ects o¤set each other
and the rst best is implementable. However, taxation still causes dead-weight
losses, as evident from (2).
Two important results follow when combining (15) with (13), which we write
here for the case gt > 0:
(17) uc (ct) =

1  v
0 (St)
First, since v (:) is strictly concave, rent extraction is decreasing in the mar-
ginal utility of consumption. Thus governments will chose to extract more rents
in "good times". Second, the parameter  governs the optimal allocation be-
tween the provision of the transfer good (to obtain the desired level of ct) and
rent extraction. As  increases, the government will allocate more cyclical ex-
penditures to rents, St, and less to the transfer good, gt. Equation (15) will
make gt countercyclical, while St will be procyclical, as long as consumption is
procyclical. When rent-seeking motivations () are low, gt will dominate the
cyclicality of government spending and government expenditure will be coun-
tercyclical. As  increases, the cyclicality of St may come to dominate and
government expenditure will be procyclical.
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We now formalize these results, for the case of i.i.d. shocks and looking at
a single period, with a predetermined level of indebtedness, bt. Government
expenditure is inversely related with income when  = 0. For preferences of
a specic functional form, we show that government spending becomes less
countercyclical (or more procyclical) as the parameter , governing rent-seeking,
increases.
3.6 i.i.d Shocks
We consider how government expenditure, Gt = gt+St, responds to a change in
income, reected in the wage rate wt, when the government is entirely altruistic,
 = 0, and when it is rent-seeking,  > 0. We consider a government entering
a period with a predetermined level of debt, bt. This, of course, abstracts
from the long-term dynamic interactions between scal policy and debt. In the
following section, simulations provide the dynamics of the system, allowing for
the evolution of debt to interact with the cyclicality of scal policy.
If shocks are i.i.d, the current realization of the shock to wt provides no
information regarding future shocks. In this case, if borrowing constraints are
not binding, the left hand side of (12) is only a function of the governments
choice of bt+1. An increase in bt+1 leaves the government with a higher level of
debt in the following period, so that (12), (13), and the requirement that the
government be able to repay its debts almost surely, imply that the right hand
side of (12) is increasing in bt+1. Combining equation (17) with (12) and (13),
when gt > 0 (t = 0) gives:
(18) uc (ct) =

1  v
0 (St) =  (1 + r)Et+1 (bt+1)
Where the rst equality is written for those states for which it is optimal to
provide the transfer payment (gt > 0), and we assume for the moment that bt
is such that the borrowing constraint is slack for all possible wage realizations
wt 2 [wmin; wmax]. Rewriting (6) gives:
(19) St + ct   bt+1 = wt`t   (1 + r) bt
We conjecture that wt`t is strictly increasing in wt. Then equations (18) and
(19) require that St and ct both be strictly increasing in wt and that bt+1 be
strictly decreasing in wt. We now provide a lemma stating that our conjecture
is correct. This lemma will also imply that any discussion of the cyclicality of
13
variables with respect to wages also holds with respect to income.
Lemma 2 When transfers are provided (gt > 0), income (wt`t) is increasing
in wages.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since  (1 + r) < 1, increases in ct and St due to changes in wt may not
be innitesimal, even though shocks are i.i.d. (5) now implies that an increase
in wt causes gt    twt`t to decrease, since bt+1   St is decreasing and bt is
predetermined at time t. Recalling that when gt > 0;  t = 0; this means gt is
decreasing in income, for those wage realizations for which gt > 0. This logic
also holds if  = 0.
To ensure that gt is decreasing in wt over the entire support of w, it still
remains to be seen whether it is the case that gt = 0 for wage realizations that
are higher than those for which gt > 0. Lemma 3 states that there exists a
cuto¤ wage below which gt  0; and above which gt = 0.
Lemma 3 If there exists an income level for which  t > 0 and an income level
for which gt > 0; there exists a cuto¤ wage, w, below which the government
transfers, gt  0, and above which the government taxes,  t  0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given that gt is decreasing in wt when gt > 0, and gt = 0 below a cuto¤
wage, gt is decreasing in wt for all wt 2 [wmin; wmax]. The result in proposition
1 follows directly.
Proposition 1 With i.i.d shocks, for a given level of government debt ( bt)
the government transfer ( gt) is (weakly) decreasing in income.
Corollary When no rent-seeking is present,  = 0, St = 0, so that govern-
ment expenditure Gt = gt is (weakly) decreasing in wages.
It is di¢ cult to obtain a general result regarding cyclicality of St. To facili-
tate the analysis, we assume a specic functional form for consumer preferences.
Assumption 1 Consumer preferences take the following functional form:
(20) u (ct; `t) = log (ct) + h (`t)
where h0 (:) < 0 and h00 (:) < 0.
Assumption 1 ensures that as long as borrowing constraints are not binding,
(18) holds over the entire support of w. This is because with preferences over
consumption taking the logarithmic form, (1  t) = 0 8wt; in equation (15).
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Assumption 1 also implies that wt`t is increasing in wt even when gt = 0 and
 t > 0. This is because whenever gt = 0 and  t > 0; equations (1) and (2) can
now be combined to state
(21) 1 = ctuc (ct) =  `tu` (`t) =  `th0 (`t)
Since h00(:) < 0 there is a unique level `t = `that satises (21). It must therefore
be the case that wt`t = wt ` is increasing in wt.
With these two results stemming from Assumption 1, (18) and (19) imply
directly that St is increasing in wt, as formalized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 1, i.i.d shocks, and a given level of gov-
ernment debt ( bt) rents (St) are (weakly) increasing in income.
Finally noting that Gt = gt + St and that (17) implies that Sts proportion
of Gt is increasing in , we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 Given Assumption 1, i.i.d shocks, and a given level of gov-
ernment debt ( bt), government spending (Gt) is (weakly) decreasing in income
when  = 0. Government spending becomes (weakly) increasing in wages for a
su¢ ciently high level of .
3.7 Borrowing Constraints
Could the presence of borrowing constraints generate procyclical scal expen-
ditures, even in the absence of a rent-seeking government? When borrowing
constraints are binding (bt = bmax) and no rent-seeking is present, (5) becomes:
(22) gt    twt`t = bmax   (1 + r) bt
Since the government is either transferring or taxing in a given period, but
not both, gt = max fbmax   (1 + r) bt; 0g : Since the rst term is predetermined
at time t, gt is the same for any income realization for which the borrowing
constraint is binding. It is worth noting that, in a dynamic sense, it is most
likely that gt = 0 when borrowing constraints are binding. The requirement that
debt be repaid almost surely would necessitate a tax-nanced debt repayment,
with government transfers set to zero. The analysis that follows is una¤ected
by this fact.
If the borrowing constraint is binding, government spending is una¤ected by
the realization of the stochastic shock. For those income realizations for which
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the borrowing constraint is not binding, bt+1 < bmax, so that (22) turns into
(23) gt    twt`t = bt   (1 + r) bt < bmax   (1 + r) bt
The government transfer is always lower for those income realizations where
the borrowing constraint is not binding. Lemma 4 below states that borrow-
ing constraints are binding when the wage realization is low. Since government
expenditure is una¤ected by income when borrowing constraints are binding
and is lower (and decreasing in income based on Proposition 1) for the higher
income levels where borrowing constraints are not binding, government expendi-
ture remains decreasing in income even when borrowing constraints are present.
Propositions 1-3 remain intact even in the presence of borrowing constraints.
Lemma 4 For a given level of debt (bt) if borrowing constraints bind for an
income level reected in a wage rate ~w; they also bind for all w < ~w.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the government cannot seek rents ( = 0), borrowing constraints may
make government spending less countercyclical, but not procyclical. Moreover,
Lemma 4 implies that borrowing constraints are expected to bind in business
cycle troughs. If borrowing constraints are the cause for the procyclicality of
government expenditure, we would expect government expenditure to be more
procyclical in business cycle troughs, which is not evident in the data.
3.8 Summary of Results
1. The governments provision of social insurance spending (gt) is decreasing
in income.
2. When the government is entirely altruistic ( = 0), government expendi-
tures are decreasing in income.
3. With a specic class of preferences (Assumption 1), if the institutional
capacity of the government to extract rents through the scal process ()
is su¢ ciently high, government expenditures are increasing in income.
4. Borrowing constraints do not alter these results.
5. If the government is not rent-seeking, borrowing constraints may make
the response of government spending to income less pronounced. How-
ever, this occurs at low wage realizations. This is counter to the stylized
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fact that government expenditure is similarly procyclical in business cycle
peaks as in troughs.
4 Numerical Simulation
This section provides a quantitative analysis of the models dynamics. The
simulations indicate that neither borrowing constraints nor the volatility of the
business cycle can account alone for scal procyclicality. On the other hand,
increases in rent-seeking do yield procyclical scal policy of the magnitudes
observed in developing countries.
4.1 Preferences
We now assume that consumerspreferences take the following form:
(24) u (c; `) = log c+A log (1  `)
while the governments preferences over rents will take the CRRA form:
v (S) =
S1 
1   for  2 (0;1);  6= 1(25)
v (S) = logS for  = 1
We assume that  = 1, so that the government is as risk averse as its citizens.
A sensitivity analysis, available upon request, demonstrates that the simula-
tionsqualitative results are not altered with di¤erent degrees of government
risk aversion.
The model is simulated in three environments. First, it is simulated with
the business cycle features of the United States. This simulation shows coun-
tercyclical government expenditures when no rent-seeking motivation is present
and procyclical government expenditures when rent-seeking motivations are suf-
ciently high. Second, a simulation with Argentinas more volatile business
cycle demonstrates that the higher volatility observed in emerging markets in
fact causes government spending that is more countercyclical. This is because,
with higher business-cycle volatility, there is an even stronger demand for in-
tertemporal social insurance. With a rent-seeking government, spending again
becomes procyclical. Finally, the model is simulated with the business cycle
features of Argentina and borrowing constraints. The results do not appear to
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be signicantly a¤ected by borrowing constraints.
Before turning to the simulation results, the models calibration is described.
We show that when neoclassical rms are introduced, the wage rate is perfectly
correlated with the productivity shock, so that we can use the standard sto-
chastic processes for productivity shocks to calibrate the wage process in our
model.
4.2 Firms
Firms produce the uniform consumption good using labor as a single input, with
the following production technology:
(26) f (`t) = ezt`t
Where `t is the quantity of labor supplied and zt is a productivity parameter.
The rst order condition of the rmsprot maximization problem implies:
(27) wt = ezt
so that there is a monotonic relationship between the wage process and the
exogenous productivity shock.
4.3 Calibration
We assume the productivity shock, zt; follows an AR(1) process:
(28) zt   z =  (zt 1   z) + t
where z is the trend level of productivity, which is normalized to 0;  is the
degree of autocorrelation; and t is an i.i.d shock normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance 2. For the U.S., the model is calibrated to match zt to
the Solow residual. Since the model is calibrated to annual data, this yields
 = 0:954 and  = 0:0144.
As suggested by Mendoza (1991), when calibrating the model to match Ar-
gentinas business cycle features, Argentinas terms of trade are used as the
exogenous shock. Using the International Monetary Funds (IMF) World Eco-
nomic Outlook (WEO) data for the period 1970-2003, Argentinas business cycle
process can be represented as  = 0:60 and  = 0:079.
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We assume an annual interest rate of 4%.  is calibrated to ensure that
when calibrated to the business cycle features of Argentina, the economys debt-
to-GDP ratio is on average 24%, matching Argentinas average indebtedness
in the 1990s, based on World Bank Global Development Finance and World
Development Indicators data. This results in  = 0:952. The value of A, the
relative marginal value consumers place on leisure compared with consumption,
is calibrated to induce consumers work at most 1/3 of their disposable time.
4.4 Results
Figure IV presents the simulationsmain results. The solid curves represent the
correlation between government expenditure and GDP in three sets of simula-
tions, each across a range of values of  (rent-seeking). The linesintersection
with the y axis are the results of benchmark models, in which  = 0, i.e. with
no political distortion. To allow comparison with the data, the actual correla-
tion between (the cyclical components of) GDP and government expenditure
in the U.S. and Argentina are shown in dotted lines. We plot simulations for
 2 [0; 0:5]. For  > 0:5, the models dynamics are identical to those when
 = 0:5. In that range, rent-seeking motivations are high enough to preclude
any social insurance (gt = 0 8t).
When calibrated to the business cycle features of the United States, the
model predicts countercyclical government expenditure when no political dis-
tortion is present. In fact, the models prediction is close to the actual cyclicality
of government expenditure in the United States. Moving along the x axis, as
rent-seeking motivations increase, scal policy becomes less countercyclical, then
procyclical.
With the business cycle features of Argentina, the results are qualitatively
the same. Without the political distortion, government expenditure is more
countercyclical, compared to the simulation with the business cycle features of
the United States. This is because the need for intertemporal insurance for
consumers increases with higher business-cycle volatility. Matching the cycli-
cality of government expenditure observed in Argentina requires intermediate
degrees of rent-seeking motivations (  0:2). With the business cycle features
of the United States, even lower degrees of rent-seeking are required to gener-
ate procyclical government spending. This is because with the relatively low
volatility of the business cycle of the United States, even moderate degrees of
rent-seeking shut down the intertemporal insurance role of government spend-
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ing (consumption smoothing can be achieved through taxation, with relatively
small tax-distortion costs).
In the rst two simulations we excluded any simulation round in which bor-
rowing constraints were binding. The third simulation, including borrowing
constraints, included simulation results where borrowing constraints were bind-
ing at least 10% of the simulation periods. Figure IV shows that even while
borrowing constraints are binding, the results of the model are both qualita-
tively and quantitatively similar. Binding borrowing constraints do not induce
procyclical spending when no rent-seeking is present.
5 Conclusions
Imperfections in capital markets are frequently assumed to be the main culprit
for the procyclicality of scal policy. The volatile business cycle environment in
developing countries is also often cited. The theory presented here raises ques-
tions regarding the these economic causes for procyclicality. It demonstrates
theoretically and numerically that use of the scal process for rent-seeking pur-
poses is a plausible alternative explanation.
The model presented in this paper assumes that the main function of scal
policy, and the main reason for its countercyclicality in industrialized countries,
is intertemporal insurance provided by governments to their citizens. Given
the proportion of high-income countriesbudget spent on social insurance, this
assumption would appear to be a reasonable one. While showing that rent-
seeking within the scal process can cause scal procyclicality, the model may
also contribute to explaining why the resources devoted to social insurance in
many developing countries is smaller than in industrial countries.
The paper provides interesting policy insights as well. The liquidity that
international nancial institutions provide to developing countries during nan-
cial crises is partially motivated by the perception that imperfections in inter-
national nancial markets make it di¢ cult for developing countries to borrow
during crises. The idea that this insurance may be counterproductive due to
moral hazard has a long history. However, this paper questions the utility of
this insurance from a new angle. The model presented here implies that in
some countries, rent extraction may be procyclical. If this is indeed the case,
lending by international nancial institutions may provide relief to the citizens
of developing countries during these crises, but the anticipation of such assis-
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tance enables additional rent extraction during good times, so that much of
this assistance is actually paying, ex-post, for rent-seeking activities that have
already occurred. Finally, conditionality imposed by these institutions typically
restricts decits following crises. The model predicts that unless scal austerity
targets are imposed over the entire cycle, they may not be welfare improving.
This paper suggests that focussing on decit targets without addressing the de-
ciencies of scal institutions provides at best a partial solution to the problems
of scal policy in developing countries.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1 It is never optimal for the government to tax and transfer in the
same period.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that in a certain period gt > 0 and  t > 0.
Since gtt = 0, t = 0, which in turn implies that t = 0, due to (11). This last
result uses the fact that u(c; `) satises the Inada conditions, so that uc (ct) 6= 0
for any nite level of consumption. Combining equations (9) and (10) with the
fact that t = t = 0, we obtain:
(A1) uc + wul = 0
Comparing (A1) with (2) implies that  t = 0, contradicting the assumption
that  t > 0.
Lemma 2 When transfers are provided, gt > 0; income, wt`t; is increasing
in wages.
Proof. If `t is increasing in wt, wt`t is unambiguously increasing in wt. If,
conversely, `t is decreasing in wt; u` (ct; `t) is increasing in wt. Given that we
are considering the case gt > 0; which via Lemma 1 implies that  t = 0; (2)
imposes that uc (ct; `t) is strictly decreasing in wt. With ct strictly increasing
in wt; (18) requires that St be strictly increasing and bt+1 be strictly decreasing
in wt. Finally, having asserted that St and ct are strictly increasing, and bt+1
strictly decreasing in wt; the left hand side of (19) must be increasing in wt.
Given that bt is predetermined, this requires that wt`t also be increasing in wt.
Lemma 3 If there exists a wage rate in the support of w; for which  t > 0
and a wage rate for which gt > 0; there exists a cuto¤ wage, w, below which the
government transfers, gt  0, and above which the government taxes,  t  0.
Proof. Let w be the highest wage rate at which which gt  0 is non-binding.
Since gt is decreasing in wt, this wage rate must be either wmax or some w
for which gt  0. If wmax is the highest wage, the fact that gt is decreasing in
wt requires that gt  0 is non-binding for all values of w 2 [wmin; wmax]. This
violates the assumption that there exists a wage for which  t > 0 is optimal,
due to Lemma 1. Thus, there must be a wage w; which is the largest wage for
which gt  0 and the non-negativity constraint gt  0 is non-binding. Consider
now any wage, wlow < w. We have already seen that equations (18), (19)
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and (5) imply g (wlow) > g (w) is optimal, as long as g (wlow) does not violate
g (wlow)  0. This must be the case since g (w)  0 by assumption. Then
it must be the case that gt  0 8w < w. By our denition of w, gt = 0;
and therefore  t  0 for all w > w. w is the cuto¤ wage below which the
government transfers and above which the government taxes.
Lemma 4 At a given level of debt bt, if borrowing constraints bind for a
wage level ~w; they also bind for all w < ~w.
Proof. Let c ( ~w) ; S ( ~w) ; ` ( ~w) ; b0 ( ~w) = bmax be the solution to the gov-
ernments optimization problem when bt is given and ~w is the wage realiza-
tion. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a wage wnb < ~w for which
b0 (wnb) < bmax is the optimal debt choice. Let c (wnb) ; S (wnb) ; ` (wnb) denote
the optimal choices of other variables when bt is given and wnb is the wage real-
ization. Since wnb` (wnb) < ~w` ( ~w) ; due to Lemma 2, (18) and (19) imply that
c (wnb) < c ( ~w) ; S (wnb) < S ( ~w) and b0 ( ~w) > b0 ( ~w) = bmax. This contradicts
the assumption that b0 (wnb) < bmax. Therefore borrowing constraints must
bind for wnb:
Appendix B: Empirical Evidence
A number of empirical studies have captured the stylized facts of the cycli-
cality of scal policy and attempted to explain the potential causes for di¤ering
cyclical patterns among countries. It has been shown elsewhere that scal policy
is often procyclical, mainly in developing countries (Gavin and Perotti, 1997;
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004). A number of studies have sought the
causes for scal procyclicality through cross-country regressions. Their results
demonstrate that much or all of the cross-country heterogeneity in scal pro-
cyclicality, attributed to di¤erences in income per capita in the introduction
to this paper, is due to political-economy factors, consistent with the theory
presented here. In high-income countries, Lane (2003) is unable to reject the
hypothesis that political-economy factors contribute to the procyclicality of gov-
ernment expenditures in high-income countries. Alesina and Tabellini (2005)
conclude that scal procyclicality is no longer correlated with income per capita
after controlling for corruption in a panel regression including both high-income
and developing countries. They show that both democracy and its interaction
with corruption are also statistically signicant in explaining the procyclicality
of government expenditures. However, corruption remains a statistically sig-
nicant explanatory variable for the procyclicality of government expenditures
even after controlling for democracy and its interaction with corruption, imply-
ing that procyclicality is correlated with corruption even in non-democracies.
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This leaves a residual theoretical need for a model of scal procyclicality that
does not require votersdisciplining of the scal process.
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) dene procyclical scal policy as a combination
of a procyclical ratio of government expenditures to GDP and a procyclical ratio
of borrowing to GDP, after correcting for terms of trade shocks and past decits.
This follows the approach used in Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Luis Catão and
Bennett Sutton (2002). This measure of procyclicality has been critiqued by
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), who argue that it makes little sense to
discuss the cyclicality of policy in terms of outcomes; instead, the cyclicality of
policy instruments should be considered. Following Kaminsky, Reinhart, and
Vegh (2004) and consistent with the theoretical results of the previous section,
we measure procyclicality using the correlation of the HP-ltered components
of real government expenditure and real GDP. Although this measure is highly
correlated with Gavin and Perottis (1997) in a cross country comparison, it is
interesting to determine whether the results of pervious studies are robust to
using this more appropriate procyclicality variable.
Consistent with the results of previous studies, corruption is found to be the
main variable determining cross-country di¤erences in scal procyclicality. In
addition to demonstrating the robustness of earlier results of OLS regressions,
we also provide evidence that the relationship between scal procyclicality and
corruption is not due to reverse causality, through an instrumental variables
regression.
Estimation Strategy
Consider the following empirical model:
(29) Pi = Xi + i
where Pi is the degree of procyclicality (of government expenditures) of country
i, and Xi is a vector of candidate explanatory variables for procyclicality. The
choice of explanatory variables for procyclicality follows Alesina and Tabellini
(2005). They regress their measure of procyclicality against an indicator of
corruption, an indicator of democracy, and initial GDP per capita. In this
study, the vector of exogenous variables, X, includes these variables and an
a measure government size, as in Lane (2003). OLS regressions conrm that
an indicator of control of corruption is correlated with the procyclicality of
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government expenditure; di¤erences in income levels are no longer correlated
with procyclicality after controlling for this measurement of corruption.
This approach, employed by Lane (2003), and Alesina and Tabellini (2005),
may su¤er from reverse causality. While corruption may cause scal procycli-
cality, it is also possible that scal procyclicality, caused by other factors, makes
it easier for corruption to persist. The problem of reverse causality is partic-
ularly important given that the control of corruption variable only exists for
recent years. While cross-country comparisons of institutional quality tend to
be persistent, it is still problematic that the exogenous variable used in an OLS
regression such as Alesina and Tabellinis (2005), is measured at the end of the
period of the measurement of the endogenous one.
To control for the possibility of reverse causality, OLS regressions are aug-
mented by instrumental variables regressions. In the latter, we use countries
distance from the equator as an instrument for control of corruption. As sug-
gested by William Easterly and Ross Levine (2003) and others, this geographical
feature is correlated with institutional quality5 . This is an appropriate instru-
mental variable since it is clearly exogenous, it is correlated with control of
corruption, and there is no a-priori reason why it should a¤ect the cyclicality of
scal policy directly. To further reassure the reader of the strength of this in-
strument, reported F-statistics of the rst stage of the regression are well above
the threshold of Stock and Yogos (2002) test for weak instruments. The results
of the IV regression demonstrate that earlier empirical results connecting scal
procyclicality with corruption were not driven by reverse causality.
The Data
We measure procyclicality using the correlation between the cyclical component
(using a Hodrick-Prescott lter) of real government expenditure with the cycli-
cal component of real GDP, over the period 1970 to 2003. This provides one
observation for the procyclicality variable, ranging in value from -1 to 1, for
each one of the 102 countries in the sample.
We measure corruption using the World Banks control of corruption indica-
tor (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005) averaged over the years 1996-2004
(the entire span of the series). While some forms of rent-seeking may not register
as corruption, such as rent-seeking by special interest groups or workersunions,
5The use of another popular measure for institutions, settler mortality, as proposed by
Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson (2001) also rejects the notion of reverse causality, but
yields less robust results, given the loss of observations required to use this instrument.
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the denition of the control of corruption variable comes close to the theoretical
approach employed here. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) dene their
indicator as "measuring the exercise of public power for private gain", similarly
to the way rent extraction is modelled here. The control of corruption indicator
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, decreasing in the amount of corruption.
The dummy variable, Democracy, is constructed using the Polity IV data-
base as follows. The Polity IV variable is constructed by subtracting the Polity
IV Autocracy indicator from its Democracy indicator. Since both indica-
tors are on a scale of 0 to 10, the Polity IV variable used here ranges from -10
to 10. The Polity IV variable is then taken as the average annual score over the
time period considered. Democracy obtains a value of 1 if the Polity IV variable
is positive. For robustness, the same empirical analysis is conducted with the
Polity IV variable itself and with the YearsDemoc variable, which counts the
number of years a country is dened as a democracy in the Polity IV sample
between 1970 and 2003. We control for income using initial (1970) PPP GDP
per capita in US dollars, taken from the Penn World Tables. Government size
is accounted for with initial (1970) government expenditure to GDP (using IMF
WEO data).
Results
OLS regression results are summarized in Table A.I. Column 1 shows the styl-
ized fact discussed in much of the empirical literature and captured in Figure
A.I: Procyclicality is decreasing in income per capita. The pairwise correlation
between procyclicality and per-capita GDP indicates that a $1000 increase in
1970 PPP GDP decreases the correlation between the cyclical components of
government expenditures and GDP by 15 percentage points. As demonstrated
in Column 2, procyclicality is also highly correlated with corruption, with a
1-point increase in the Control of Corruption score decreasing the correlation
between the cyclical components of government expenditure and GDP by 18
percentage points. This is not surprising, given that GDP and the Control of
Corruption variable are highly correlated (with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.87
and T-statistic of 16.9). Column 3 shows that the relationship between cor-
ruption and procyclicality is robust to controlling for initial GDP per capita.
Corruption remains statistically signicant at the 5% level, with a coe¢ cient
of similar magnitude, while GDP per capita is only a statistically signicant
explanatory variable at the 10% level. When additional controls are added in
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columns 4 and 5, corruption remains statistically signicant at the 5% level,
while GDP per capita is no longer statistically signicant. This indicates that
much of the heterogeneity in procyclicality, seemingly across income lines, is
due to rent-seeking.
A number of (unreported) robustness checks were conducted. Results do not
di¤er when using general- instead of central-government expenditures. They are
also robust to the exclusion of oil-producing countries, the ve most procyclical
countries, and the ve most corrupt countries. Table A.II attempts to recreate
Alesina and Tabellinis (2005) result that democracy and the interaction be-
tween democracy and corruption have explanatory power for the procyclicality
of government expenditures. Using three di¤erent measures for democracy in
Columns 1-3, we were unable to reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on
measures of democracy are of no statistical signicance, while Control of Cor-
ruption remains statistically signicant at the 5%-10% level. Column 4 adds
an interaction term between corruption and democracy as suggested by Alesina
and Tabellini (2005), it too is statistically insignicant.
Table A.III conducts an additional robustness check to ensure that the results
are not driven by reverse causality. The IV regressions reported in Table A.III
control for this possibility by using the absolute value of each countrys latitude
as an instrument for corruption, as in Easterly and Levine (2003). The results in
Table A.III show that the correlation between the procyclicality of government
expenditure and corruption remains intact.
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Figure I:
Cyclicality of Gov. Expenditures and GDP per Capita
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HP-filtered cyclical components total of real central government expenditures and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using IMF WEO data. PPP GDP per 
capita in US$ in 1970 is from the Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) database.
Figure II:
Procyclicality of Gov. Revenues and GDP per Capita
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HP-filtered cyclical components of real central government revenues and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using IMF WEO data.  PPP GDP per 
capita in US$ in 1970 is from the Heston-Summers database.
Figure III:
Cyclicality of Gov. Balance and GDP per Capita
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HP-filtered cyclical components of real overall central government balance and real GDP from 1970 to 2003, using IMF WEO data. 
GDP per capita in US$ in 1970 is from the Heston-Summers database.
Figure IV: Government Expenditure & Rent Seeking Distortions
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U.S. Calibrated Model Argentina Calibrated Model
Model with Borrowing Constraints Argentina Actual
U.S. Actual
Simulated correlations between HP-filtered total government expenditure (G) and output (y) in three sets of simulations: (1) Calibrated to the business cycle of the 
United States, (2) Calibrated to the business cycle of Argentina, with borrowing constraints never binding and (3) Calibrated to Argentina, including only simulations 
where borrowing constraints were binding at least 10% of the simulation periods. Changes along the x-axis reflect changes in the α parameter, governing rent-
High-Income Countries Developing Countries
Total Government 
Expenditure -.12 .37
Government 
Consumption .21 .23
Government Capital 
Formation .29 .30
Government Interest 
Expenditure -.07 -.04
Cyclical component estimated using Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 (annual data)
Source: IMF WEO, except for interest expenditure from the International Monetary Fund's 
Government Finance Statistics. Correlations are between 1970 and 2003.
 n=81 for developing countries and n=21 for high-income countries, except capital expenditures where 
the number of observations is for high-income countries drops to 20. 
 For interest expenditrures n=20 for high-income countries and n=66 for developing countries. 
For interest expenditures, the time period of the correlation varies from country to country.
Table I
Components of Government Expenditure
Average correlation of cyclical component with the cyclical component of GDP
 
Developing Countries
All Periods                     .37
Excluding Crises .33
Periods with Ouptut 
Above Trend .25
Periods with Ouptut 
Below Trend .29
Cyclical component estimated using Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 (annual data)
Source: IMF WEO. Correlations are between 1970 and 2003.
Crisis periods are defined as periods when the cyclical component of GDP is 
two standard deviations below trend or lower. 
n=81
Table II
Correlation between Government Expenditure and GDP
Comparison along the business cycle
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control of 
Corruption
-.183 ***  
(-6.54)
-.117 **     
(-2.2)
-.122  **    
(-2.27) 
-.114  **   
(-2.00) 
GDP per 
Capita
-0.00015 ***  
(-7.17)
-0.00007 *   
(-1.72)
-.00007   *   
(-1.66)   
-.00007    
(-1.60)
Government 
Size
0.178       
(0.67)   
0.139      
(0.49)   
Democracy -.037      (-0.51)   
Adjusted R-
squared 0.36 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.37
n 93 102 93 93 93
T Statistics in parentesis
* - Significant at 10%
** - Significant at 5%
*** - Significant at 1%
Table A.I
OLS Estimates: Dependent Variable: 
Correlation between Central Government Expenditure and GDP
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control of 
Corruption
-.114  **    
(-2.00) 
-.099 *   
(-1.68)
-.096 *   
(-1.67)
-.123       
(-1.15) 
Democracy -.037      (-0.51)   
-.030       
(-0.32)   
Polity IV -.007    (-0.94)   
Years Democratic  -.003    (-0.34)   
Corruption*Democracy -.013       (-0.10)   
Adjusted R-
squared 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36
n 93 102 93 93
T Statistics in parentesis
* - Significant at 10%
** - Significant at 5%
*** - Significant at 1%
GDP and Size of Government included in regression; results not reported for brevity.
Table A.II: Different Measures of Democracy
OLS Estimates: Dependent Variable: 
Correlation between Central Government Expenditure and GDP
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control of Corruption -.213 ***  (-5.89)
-.244 **    
(-2.19)
 -.263  **    
(-2.22) 
-.263  **    
(-2.14) 
GDP per Capita -0.00002    
(-0.20)
0.00002     
(0.31)
0.00008     
(0.31)
Government Size  0.238       (0.75)   
0.246       
(0.72)   
Democracy .0098       (0.82)   
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.36 0.34 0.33
n 98 89 89 89
F-Stat in 1st Stage 155.32 200.83 133.18 111.8
T Statistics in parentesis
* - Significant at 10%
** - Significant at 5%
*** - Significant at 1%
Instrument: Distance from the Equator
Table A.III: Instrumental Variables Estimation
IV Estimates: Dependent Variable: 
Correlation between Central Government Expenditure and GDP
 
